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• There is now a powerful evidence base for heroin-assisted treatment (HAT). In view 
of the present epidemic of drug-related mortality, the treatment should have a more 
significant role in public health policy. 
• Much research concerning the impact of the international drug control regime on 
the implementation of harm reduction interventions by member states attributes an 
often ‘chilling’ role of the guardian of the UN drug control conventions, the 
International Narcotics Control Board (INCB or Board) 
• Interviews with former health officials from countries that pioneered the trialling of 
HAT in the 1990s revealed that while some felt that the INCB sought to act as a break 
on the intervention, others believed that - although the Board was generally hostile 
to new policy interventions - its stance on HAT was relatively neutral. 
• In recent years, the INCB has undergone a shift in tone and outlook regarding HAT, 
changes that took place particularly under the leadership of Werner Sipp. 
• However, the UN drug control system, including the World Health Organisation, has 
in general been lukewarm at best in its support for HAT. 
• The most realistic and promising appraisal of HAT came in the UN System Report of 
2019, which directly backed the use of HAT. 
• The INCB has clearly long been hostile to drug policy innovation and has carried this 
over into its attitudes to HAT.  Yet, while the influence of the Board is complex, it is 
likely that national governments themselves are the main source of reluctance in 
making use of this intervention. 
 
1 Independent Researcher and Research Associate, GDPO 
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Introduction 
This working paper examines the present situation regarding Heroin-assisted treatment 
(HAT), in addition to the early history (in the 1990s and early 2000s) of HAT as a contemporary 
drug treatment intervention. It explores domestic policy contexts in several countries making 
use of the intervention, with particular reference to those states that pioneered it, such as 
Switzerland and the Netherlands. It deploys a special focus on the relationships obtaining 
between these countries and the institutions of the United Nations-administered 
international drug control regime, relationships which have been long-contested and 
provided the context for disputes surrounding both HAT and other innovative forms of drug 
policies and practices. 
The paper conducts a brief global survey of HAT trials, which have provided the evidence base 
for the intervention, and facilities where it is practiced. It considers the key policy debates 
within which the intervention sits, drawing on evidence gathered from both documentary 
sources and interviews with former officials from countries which, in the context of HAT, dealt 
with the International Narcotics Control Board (INCB or Board) and the international drug 
control regime more broadly.1 The author sets out with a working hypothesis regarding the 
INCB, namely that it was a prominent force in blocking the progress of HAT in UN member 
states.2 This hypothesis was tested against the empirical textual evidence gathered in the 
course of research and will be discussed further below. 
Heroin-assisted treatment 
Heroin-assisted treatment involves supplying pure pharmaceutical diacetylmorphine 
(diamorphine, heroin) to those who are dependent on the drug but have not benefited from 
the standard substitution therapies utilising methadone and buprenorphine. It is currently 
considered most effective as a second line treatment that assists people to escape the 
criminal entailments of addiction to street heroin and the health hazards associated with illicit 
drug use, such as the sharing of needles and other injection paraphernalia that lead to the 
risk of infection with HIV, Hepatitis C and other viral illnesses. Doses are administered under 
direct supervision with medical staff in attendance, a framework that which distinguishes HAT 
from previous forms of heroin treatment such the classic ‘British System’ of 1916 to 19673. 
Further treatment modalities are available, and medical and social support services at hand.  
A considerable evidence base has been accumulated to underpin the treatment. The 
prescribing and administration of diamorphine to people dependant on heroin has expanded 
greatly in recent decades and has now reached the point at which the highly respected RAND 
Drug Policy Research Institute has been urging the Federal authorities to undertake 
Randomised Controlled Trials in the historically hostile territory of the United States. This 
position is based on a close review of the evidence carried out by RAND researchers, but it 
remains to be seen whether US politicians will want to take on such an apparently risky- it is 
perceived as electorally unpopular- mode of addiction treatment.   
At first sight, there has been relatively little engagement of the UN drug control regime with 
heroin assisted treatment, though under the leadership of Yury Fedotov, which commenced 
in 2010, the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) has declared its general 
3 | P a g e  
 
support for public health interventions and human rights imperatives in the field of illicit 
drugs, both in law enforcement measures and those providing therapeutic treatment.4 This 
new emphasis may have been generated in part by the deliberation in the UN system in the 
lead up to the 2016 Special Session on Drugs, in which several other UN agencies participated, 
including the UN Development Programme, UNAIDS and others taking the debates outside 
the Vienna drug control bodies and their field of understanding.5 
The INCB, the watchdog of the UN drug control conventions that underpin the regime’s legal 
and normative architecture, has at least softened its position somewhat, too, after spending 
a number of years expressing its ‘concerns’ about the impact of HAT, though still stopping far 
short of a ringing endorsement in its 2017 Report.  In 1999, the INCB had rejected the validity 
of any conclusions drawn from the ground-breaking HAT trials in Switzerland and was 
supported in this rejection by the Director General of the WHO. The Board also advised other 
countries not to follow the Swiss approach by offering supervised heroin on prescription (for 
a detailed account see below). 
The recent growth of HAT facilities is, however, likely to bring the UN system into enhanced 
engagement with the intervention, and this paper is intended to inter alia develop a dialogue 
with the International Drug Control regime with respect to this treatment modality. 
History and the emergence of heroin assisted treatment 
In the early twentieth century, maintenance-based provision of opium, morphine and heroin 
to illicit consumers did exist. In the United States, for example, which later became highly 
resistant to the medical use of heroin under any circumstances, several cities set up clinics 
that opioid consumers attended in order to receive doses of morphine, in an attempt to pre-
empt the rapidly growing black-market supply of these drugs and the urban street subculture 
it supported. By the end of 1923, however, the facilities were closed in the face of growing 
pressure from the US Federal authorities, which were working toward the total prohibition of 
heroin.6  
Britain was at this time the world’s leading location for the medical supply of heroin and 
morphine to the overwhelmingly upper- and middle-class patients who had recourse to 
private doctors and their prescription pads.7 The legal provision of heroin to these dependent 
patients became known as the ‘British System’, which was carried on until the late 1960s 
when regulatory changes were made that meant only doctors licensed by the Home Office 
could prescribe the drug, and a clinic-based system was introduced. Prior to these 
developments, any registered medical doctor could supply heroin to dependent patients, 
according to their best clinical judgement. The police were unable to intervene.8 
While the ‘British System’ is viewed as the forerunner of HAT, it important to understand the 
major differences underpinning the two modalities. Key to the British system was the 
prescribing of what are now known as ‘take-out doses’, enabling the patients to consume the 
drug at home and according to their individual choices. HAT is based, by contrast, on the strict 
medical supervision of supply, in which patients receive the drug under direct observation at 
a treatment facility and are rarely if ever permitted ‘take-outs’. 
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HAT in its contemporary form emerged firstly in Switzerland in response to a public health 
emergency. Here, open drug scenes had formed on the street of several cities, most notably 
Zurich and Bern.  Often located in public parks, these open drug scenes were tolerated by the 
police and the local authorities as a means of containing the problem, a move that was to 
some extent successful.9 However, the scenes attracted thousands of users who sourced and 
injected their heroin from the dealers who were, naturally enough, drawn to what became 
generally agreed upon as squalid and unhealthy urban spaces. They likewise attracted the 
attention of global mass media, causing embarrassment to the traditionally conservative 
Swiss authorities. 
Yet the scenes were so extensive that the usual law and order-based solutions were simply 
impractical; neither would they meet the public health imperatives that the Swiss increasingly 
recognised as central to an adequate response to the problem. An alternative approach was 
required, and it was in this context that Switzerland developed heroin-assisted treatment. 
Drawing on the experience of physicians who had had previously worked with heroin 
prescribing, a research protocol was developed and approved by the Federal Narcotics 
Commission, the national health authorities and finally the Federal government. At the 
instigation of the INCB, which repeatedly voiced its ‘concerns’ over the treatment, an external 
panel of experts was established by the World Health Organisation (WHO) to monitor the 
project and to review its conclusions (see discussion below).
The initial outcome of the Swiss response was the ‘PROVE’ study, involving approximately 
1,000 participants, conducted at 18 treatment centres between 1994 and 1996.  
Heroin-assisted treatment: practice and evidence 
As discussed briefly in the introduction, heroin-assisted treatment entails the medically 
supervised provision of heroin, either injected or smoked, in the treatment of opioid 
dependence. It is viewed amongst medical practitioners as a second-line treatment 
intervention, to be deployed in cases where individuals and their medical advisors have found 
methadone or buprenorphine, the most commonly used pharmaceutical adjuncts, to be 
ineffective. It is widely understood, that is, as a mode of opioid substitution therapy that may 
be appropriate for the most hard-to-reach and intractable heroin consumers. This 
understanding was incorporated into the Swiss structure, and subsequently into the HAT 
research and practice in other countries that adopted or trialled the treatment. According to 
figures provided by Ambros Uchtenhagen in 2017, 10   HAT is provided by 58 clinics in 8 
countries, though reaching only 1 per cent of people undergoing agonist maintenance in 
these countries. It has been estimated that some 5 to 10 per cent of those in substitution 
treatment do not make progress with methadone or buprenorphine.11  This means that there 
remains a considerable shortfall in the numbers of treatment slots available. Of states 
providing the treatment, the Netherlands and Switzerland are the only ones with HAT 
facilities in double figures, these being 18 and 23 respectively.12  
In practical terms, the intervention involves people who use heroin attending twice or three 
times daily at a treatment facility at which doctors, nurses and other clinical staff are present 
to supervise and, if necessary, assist in the act of injecting. Usually, the supply of diamorphine 
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is augmented by further health and social services, assistance with housing and employment 
issues, and so on. In certain trials, therapies utilising other substitution medications were 
compared with HAT, for example, the UK’s Randomised Injectable Opioid Therapy Treatment 
(RIOTT) offered injectable methadone as well as optimised oral methadone treatment, the 
latter involving high dose methadone supplemented by intensive social and health services 
provision to parallel client groups as the control measure.  
Following the WHO critique of the methodology of the PROVE research, randomised 
controlled trials (RCTs) of HAT, conceived as the ‘gold standard’ of evidence production within 
forms of knowledge claiming the status of ‘science’ and the only form of evidence taken 
seriously by government policy-makers and international drug control institutions, have been 
carried out in the following locations: Canada, Germany, the Netherlands, Spain, Switzerland 
(the PROVE study included a small element of RCT undertaken in Geneva) Belgium and the 
United Kingdom (UK) (see table 1). All these trials shared similar core objectives, including 
identifying the impact of the intervention on illicit heroin use and associated criminal 
involvement, on physical and psychological health status, social functioning, retention in 
treatment, and an investigation of the treatment’s cost-effectiveness. Generally positive 
outcomes were reported across these measures, demonstrating a greater success with 
diamorphine than with the control measure of optimised oral methadone, or with injectable 
methadone where this was offered. 
Roseanna Smart, reviewing the evidence for the RAND Institute in 2018, noted that some 
47,000 opioid overdoses had occurred in the US in 2017.13 In the light of this alarming figure, 
the author advocated the adoption in the US of two sets of measures that have been trialled 
in Europe and elsewhere: HAT and Supervised Consumption Sites (SCS). The RAND review is, 
following the trial protocols, focused on the effectiveness of HAT as a second line treatment 
option. Reviewing 10 RCTs that examined the question, it concludes that, ‘the strongest and 
most consistent effects across studies are shown for reducing illicit heroin use and improving 
treatment retention. These are important findings given the current harms people who use 
heroin face from exposure to fentanyl and other synthetic opioids in many illicit markets.’14  
The review also found injectable diamorphine to be more cost effective than oral methadone, 
largely owing to the reduction in criminal justice costs associated with the clients in the heroin 
group. These factors led the RAND authors to recommend the conducting of RCTs in the US 
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The beginnings of the HAT debate: The international drug control regime and 
policy innovation in Switzerland 
In February 1994, the INCB dispatched a mission to Switzerland. The Board’s Annual Report 
for that year, drawing attention to what it regarded as the general laxity of several countries’ 
drug control apparata, including Switzerland, noted: 
Missions of the Board have met with the Governments of Austria, Belgium and Switzerland to 
remind them of their longstanding promises to accede to the 1971 Convention. The failure of those 
major manufacturing and exporting countries to control international trade in many psychotropic 
substances has had a negative impact on the effectiveness of the international drug control 
system. The Board hopes that those States will act expeditiously to close a serious gap in the 
control of international trade in psychotropic substances. 15 
Though the preceding paragraph is not specific to HAT, it indicates the wider tensions existing 
between the Board and these countries, which formed part of the context in which 
Switzerland was operating in its attempts at policy innovation. Later, the Report stated that 
governments should review their overall legislative basis for controlling drugs and chemicals. 
It had ‘come to the attention’ of the Board that commercial companies previously known to 
have involved themselves in the diversion of psychotropic drugs were also implicated the 
diversion of precursors. It concluded the paragraph with the specific observation that ‘(t)his 
problem has been identified in Switzerland’.16 
The Annual Report went on to add that ‘(t)he failure of the Government to accede to the 1971 
Convention and to control international trade in substances in Schedules III and IV of that 
Convention has been repeatedly emphasized by the Board in its reports. Swiss territory 
continues to be used to divert psychotropic substances from international trade.’17  
As noted above, attention is drawn to these remarks in order to provide some context for the 
ensuing discussion on the Swiss plans to trial heroin assisted treatment. It is clear that 
relations between the Federal authorities in Switzerland and representatives of the INCB were 
at times tense prior to the opening of discussions. 
Another a major reason given by the INCB for its mission was linked to its concerns over the 
prospect of heroin prescription in the country. It summed up the situation thus:   
The situation in some big European cities, such as Zurich, illustrates the consequences of almost 
unrestricted availability of drugs of abuse. The many years of tolerating the sale and use of such 
drugs at certain places in the city of Zurich resulted in abusers, as well as traffickers, being attracted 
from many parts of Switzerland and from other countries, to a situation that the authorities could 
control only with difficulty. An attitude of non-intervention led to increasing drug abuse and illicit 
trafficking.18 
The Swiss population and its government were, in fact, acutely aware of the problems 
associated with drug use in the country, a situation that provoked debates in which the 
electorate was profoundly involved. Citizens had become accustomed to seeing addicts in the 
areas where drug use was prevalent, and their ill-health and chaotic lifestyles were painfully 
evident. This helped to turn the debate within the nation toward one within which drugs 
scenes were viewed primarily as involving a series of problems related to health. Moreover, 
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the institutional context of Swiss governance contributed to this view, since public health was 
part of the home affairs ministry, and no conflict arose between those departments of the 
Federal government representing, respectively, the imperatives of health and of control. The 
electorate was, moreover, an educated and engaged group, and it became increasingly clear 
that a major shift was occurring in Switzerland in relation to drug control policy.19 
This was a shift specifically toward health and pragmatism, following the broad lines of the 
government’s own vision, rather than the liberalisation of drug use and drug policy in general. 
The Swiss position became clear in two initiatives on which the electorate voted in relation to 
drug policy, the first in 1997 calling for a highly restrictive set of policies which would go so 
far as to preclude the use of Opioid Substitution Therapy (OST), the second approximately 
one year later calling for the legalisation of all presently illegal drugs. In the event, both 
extremes of the policy spectrum were rejected by the Swiss electorate, which moved closer 
to the pragmatic middle-ground espoused by its governing class.20 
The Board, nonetheless, maintained its hostility toward HAT, and went on to comment that 
the planned distribution of heroin to ‘a broad circle of addicts’ – something that did not in 
fact feature in Swiss plans – while ignoring the drug’s long-term effects on the individuals 
concerned, as well as on the wider society, was a ‘risky undertaking’.21 
The INCB’s 1994 mission reviewed the Swiss PROVE trial, under the auspices of which, from 
January of that year, a limited number of heroin users had received injectable heroin and oral 
methadone (the latter for overnight maintenance, during which time the clinics were closed). 
The Board was informed that the authorities planned to transfer the trial clients to smokable 
heroin after 6 months. It stated that a total of ‘700 patients will be integrated into the overall 
research project: 250 patients to be treated with heroin and 450 patients to be treated with 
either morphine or methadone. Since most of the addicts are also taking cocaine, plans are 
being made to provide them with cocaine in smokable form’.22  
The Federal authorities assured the INCB that the results of the trial would be thoroughly 
investigated prior to any further expansion in heroin prescribing, and the government was 
not contemplating any general legalisation of nonmedical drug consumption. Nonetheless, 
the Board concluded that:  
In the present situation, the Board recommends that the Swiss Government should invite WHO to 
take part in the consideration of the medical and scientific aspects of the ongoing Swiss clinical 
trials aimed at evaluating the efficacy of distributing heroin to addicts on a prescription basis. In 
addition, the Board urges the Commission on Narcotic Drugs to consider all of the consequences 
of the possible extension or even general application of this method, including its impact on the 
drug control policy of other countries. 23 
The Swiss government cooperated willingly with this request from the Board. An External 
Panel of assessors was convened by the WHO, and its eventual findings were critical of the 
methodological structure of the PROVE trials. It concluded that ‘(t)he final study design was a 
prospective outcome study that was intended to measure the impact of the intervention but 
could not determine the efficacy of one intervention compared to other interventions.’ 
Despite this, the Panel in broad terms agreed with the Swiss conclusions, stating that: 
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(1) it is medically feasible to provide an intravenous heroin treatment programme under highly 
controlled conditions where the prescribed drug is injected on site, in a manner that is safe, 
clinically responsible and acceptable to the community; (2) participants reported improvements in 
health and social functioning and a decrease in criminal behaviour and in reported use of illicit 
heroin.24  
The WHO’s Expert Committee on Drug Dependence (ECDD) further considered the early 
development of HAT at its 30th Meeting in 1998. It judged that the treatment had been ‘a 
subject of extensive controversy’, and that claims had been made for its efficacy ‘without 
good evidence’.25 Referring to ‘a large clinical study now in progress in Switzerland’, the 
Expert Committee concluded: 
However, because this study is neither randomized nor double-blind, but a controlled 
observational study, it will not provide robust data on comparative effectiveness or cost-
effectiveness. Further trials and studies are reported to be planned in the Netherlands. There is a 
need for rigorous experimental design in the execution of these projects if the controversial issues 
they raise are to be empirically addressed.’26  
Quoting the Director General of WHO’s findings on the PROVE study to the effect that the 
work was an ‘observational study without the possibility of making reliable unbiased 
comparisons between treatment options’, ECDD argued that it did not provide clear evidence 
for the benefits of heroin treatment over other substitution agents.27  Moreover, the study 
demonstrated ‘no causal link...between prescription of heroin and improvements in health or 
social status.’  
The INCB elaborated its conclusions regarding the Swiss heroin trials in the following terms: 
Mindful of its international responsibility as guardian of the global drug-control Conventions, and 
attentive to the last-cited conclusion of the WHO, the International Narcotics Control Board 
perceives, in the light of this study, no reason to alter its previously expressed concerns over the 
heroin project and policy of heroin prescription, which has not been based on scientific and 
medical results. It therefore does not encourage other countries to follow this course of action.28  
The Board was thus highly critical of the government response to the Swiss open drug scenes, 
which it viewed as mere tolerance of drug use, of the country’s apparent reluctance to ratify 
the Convention on Psychotropics Substances of 1971, and of the willingness of Switzerland to 
contemplate heroin prescription as a public health response, however tightly supervised.  
It is noteworthy that the INCB’s 1994 Annual Report discusses the Swiss PROVE project 
alongside the topics of harm reduction and the legalisation of nonmedical drug consumption 
– all aspects of the family of ‘controversial’ policy measures. As often pronounced by the 
Board, it was noted that ‘harm reduction programmes should not be more harmful than the 
harm that they are intended to prevent’.29 Clearly, the body consequently implied that HAT 
would be more harmful than street heroin use and all that it so often entails in terms of ill-
health and human misery. None of the subsequent evidence has supported these views. 
Nonetheless, the INCB went on to defend its position by reference to some curious rhetorical 
strategies, referring to opinion polls carried out and   
…published by the Plan Nacional Sobre Drogas of Spain which shows that only 4 per cent of the 
people of that country above the age of 18 support legalization, while over 60 per cent plainly 
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favour penalization of the non - medical use drugs and over 30 per cent are even against the use 
of substitutive (methadone) treatment for heroin addicts. In the opinion of the Board, the results 
of the poll in Spain are much more in conformity with the attitude of society in many other 
European countries than are the subjective views of some individuals or groups published in the 
mass media, which may, by presenting simplistic approaches, misdirect public opinion.30 
It is not within the mandate of the INCB to base its policies on treatment upon speculative 
notions of the potentially uneducated opinions of the population at large in Spain or any 
other country, but to identity their place within the international drug control treaties, and 
to liaise with the WHO on their scientific basis.  
In 2002, in response to the Board’s inquiries regarding the legality or otherwise of various 
harm reduction measures and to the Board’s repeatedly expressed alarm, the Legal Affairs 
Section of the then-UN Drug Control Programme examined the admissibility of these 
innovative approaches under the international drug control conventions.  Essentially, the 
Legal Affairs Section came to the opinion that, as treatment was not defined by the terms of 
the Conventions, substitution treatment with non-orthodox opioid agonists was not in 
contravention to their provisions. The legal experts compared the use of opium to maintain 
opium-users in Pakistan, and concluded that ‘what was said at the seventy-fourth session of 
medical use in respect of the provision of opium to opium addicts (E/INCB/2002/W.2/SS.2, 
paragraphs 97 and 98) would apply mutatis mutandis to the dispensation of opium to opium 
addicts or heroin to heroin addicts as substitution/maintenance treatment in a harm 
reduction strategy…’ 31  The Conventions, therefore, were deemed to contain sufficient 
flexibility for HAT to be practiced perfectly legally – though the Board had, presumably, been 
hoping for a different outcome when soliciting the opinion of the Legal Affairs Section.  
When the Swiss government began the process of amending its federal legislation to permit 
the use of heroin in treatment, following a nationwide referendum in September 1997 that 
voted in favour of the move, the INCB remarked that although:  
…the amendment recommends some limitations on the medical prescription of heroin, regarding 
both the number and types of persons to be treated, the Board reiterates its previously expressed 
concerns about the programme. The Board notes with regret that the WHO evaluation of the 
programme, requested by the Government of Switzerland at the suggestion of the Board, was not 
available before the decree was promulgated.32  
The INCB and the Netherlands 
The INCB’s relationship with the government of the Netherlands was another beset by 
tensions over drug policies, which went back long before the advent of HAT. The Board’s 
Annual Report for 1974, for example, observed that 
…the Netherlands authorities have adopted a liberal attitude towards cannabis. There can be little 
doubt that the ease of access to supplies of cannabis draws consumers to the Netherlands. This 
movement is extending to other dangerous substances as well, such as heroin and LSD. 
The Netherlands authorities are not alone in their concern about the situation, which is causing 
alarm in several neighbouring countries. While it is confident that the authorities will do all that is 
necessary, the Board has decided to keep the problem under permanent observation.33  
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This category of ‘permanent observation’ to which the Netherlands was to be made subject 
is apparently an informal one, as it is not mentioned in the international drug control 
conventions. Nonetheless, the Board has indeed carried it out, with regular interventions 
from itself and the UN drug control regime more broadly criticising the Dutch ‘coffee-shop’ 
system and the legal separation of ‘soft’ and ‘hard’ drugs that underpins it, and, like 
Switzerland, the slow pace of the country’s accession to the 1971 Convention, among other 
factors elaborated in the Board’s 1995 Annual Report.  For instance,  
…the Board expresses its continued concern at the persistence of certain practices, only slightly 
altered, which call into question the Government of the Netherlands' fidelity to its treaty 
obligations. This includes continuing the failed policy of "separation of markets", tolerating the 
continued cultivation of nederwiet provided that it is of lower THC content, permitting the 
operation of so-called coffee shops, many of which have fallen under the control of criminal 
elements, and continuing to stockpile narcotic drugs for nonmedical purposes. The Board will 
continue to observe closely the progress made by the Government of the Netherlands in fulfilling 
its treaty obligations.34  
These passages are quoted here in order, again as in the case of Switzerland, to illustrate the 
difficult relationship obtaining between the Board and the Netherlands, in this case stretching 
over decades. In its 1997 Report, the INCB ‘regretted’ that, prior to the evaluation of the Swiss 
PROVE trials, ‘pressure groups and some politicians are already promoting the expansion of 
such programmes in Switzerland and their proliferation in other countries’. It went on to state 
that: 
The Government of the Netherlands has already submitted to the Board estimates for heroin to 
be used in conducting a similar project. The Board expressed the same reservations about that 
project as it had expressed about the Swiss project and firmly believes that no further experiments 
should be undertaken until the Swiss project has undergone full and independent evaluation.35  
It is evident that both of these innovative States experienced reiterated criticism from the 
INCB over their attempts at flexible and pragmatic innovation in terms of drug policy, despite 
the long-term failure of the orthodox methods endorsed by the international drug control 
regime. ‘The INCB was against everything we did’, said one high ranking Dutch ex-official. ‘It 
was against any policy that tended toward innovation…[and]…any practical solution to the 
country’s drug problems.’ The interviewee also explained that the Board was at that time 
dominated by several conservative policy figures. Within this context, ‘The entire Dutch policy 
edifice was criticised’, he said; ‘needle exchange, pill-testing, the coffee shops, all harm 
reduction measures, HAT – everything was bad.’ The evidence on which the Board’s approach 
was supposed to be based consisted of statistics gathered by UNODC, specifically those from 
the World Drug Report. 
Interviews conducted with former Dutch Department of Health officials reveal that the INCB 
was approached submissively by the government during the early part of the 1990s. Soon 
afterwards, however, this stance was to change; a strong and outspoken figure occupied a 
senior role in the Netherlands’ Health Department and he was ‘afraid of no-one. Rather, the 
INCB was afraid of him’.36 
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According to another interviewee, the Dutch government varied by department in its 
relations with the Board, with the Justice and International Affairs Ministries tending to 
subservience toward the Board and the Health Ministry conducting a much more conflicted 
relationship.37 As such, health officials were said not to take the Board very seriously, except 
on the diplomatic surface level; the available UN data was of poor quality, sourced from the 
World Drug Report which at this point featured numerous gaps owing to the failure of 
countries to respond to the Annual Reports Questionnaires sent out by UNODC. According to 
our Dutch interviewees, these data enabled the Board to ‘say whatever it liked’. Gradually, 
one ex-official explained, the INCB lost its former authority; this was partly because of the 
Board’s reliance on suspect World Drug Report data, and partly because of its ‘eternal 
criticism’ of innovative Dutch policies. ‘There was never a positive word from the Board 
concerning our measures’, even though harm reduction policies that largely originated in the 
Netherlands spread throughout Europe and beyond. Both Dutch and Swiss officials liaising 
with the INCB on HAT projects expressed their disappointment that the INCB repeatedly 
found nothing of worth in these countries’ policies, and the only opinions the Board expressed 
were critical ones. This was despite a generally worsening set of drug problems upon which 
the orthodox responses had had little or no positive impact. 
The senior Dutch health official most critical of the INCB reported that the final straw with the 
Board came when it approached the Dutch government to try and ban a TV programme, 
translated into English as ‘Inject and Swallow’, a progressive drug and sex educational show 
broadcast in the Netherlands and aimed at the Dutch youth market.38 A popular and effective 
TV intervention that engaged young people and their drug cultures, the Board’s objection to 
the programme was regarded with some outrage by the Dutch government and this 
interjection represented the end of whatever respect the Board still enjoyed. As one former 
official from the health ministry explained, ‘That was it for me’.39 
Another Dutch ex-official believed that, while the INCB had been hostile to practically all the 
other innovative Dutch policies, it was actually largely fair in its treatment of the HAT trials, 
probably because these were clearly within the terms of the international drug control 
conventions.40 Most of the Dutch officials who were interviewed, however, remarked on the 
hostility of the INCB toward both the HAT trials and the country’s entire spectrum of drug 
policies. Many government officials of countries that experimented with heroin prescription, 
especially the pioneers such as Switzerland and the Netherlands, expressed their 
disappointment with the Board’s continued animosity toward innovation in drug policy, 
despite the fact that illicit drug consumption was expanding, and the traditional interventions 
were having little or no impact in reducing social consequences such as crime and ill-health. 
The lack of encouragement for harm reduction policies or the reform of the ‘war on drugs’ 
style of approach given prominence by the INCB provoked deep-seated dissatisfaction 
amongst these countries, whose policies were among the only effective means of reducing 
drug- and policy-related harms then in existence. 
Notwithstanding the INCB’s hostility toward innovation, the HAT genie was well and truly out 
of the bottle, with the Swiss trials – regardless of their alleged methodological weaknesses – 
inspiring much interest in other countries in Europe and beyond. Despite the INCB’s 
13 | P a g e  
 
disapproval, the trials proved to be a turning point and a catalyst for the expansion of heroin 
assisted treatment, beginning with the series of RCTs as itemised above. It is arguable that 
this is a result of the generally low esteem in which the INCB is held by governments of 
member-states, though this does vary widely. Those governments adopting similar principles 
to the Board- a conservative, strongly held commitment to the status quo of international 
drug control- naturally quote the INCB’s discourse with approval. Any understanding of the 
Board’s role in the adoption or otherwise of an intervention such as HAT must, therefore, be 
nuanced toward the complexity of social and governmental context. 
The Netherlands, the INCB, and ongoing tensions 
The Netherlands was the locus of two further Randomised Controlled Trials. Taking note of 
the methodological criticisms made about their Swiss predecessor, the Dutch exercised great 
care in the scientific planning and elaboration of the trials.  Beginning in 1998, one involved 
injectable diamorphine and the other an inhalable form for heroin smokers. Each trial 
contained a control group utilising methadone. The successful outcome of HAT in both trials 
led the Dutch government in 2004 to incorporate the two forms of heroin into its regular 
treatment arrangements as second line treatments for patients who had not responded well 
to more orthodox modes of opioid agonist therapy.  
As will be clear from the foregoing contextual discussion, this was not, however, before 
further difficulties with the INCB: 
In the Netherlands, a randomized clinical study was begun to compare the relative effectiveness 
of the use of medically co-prescribed heroin and oral methadone and the use of oral methadone 
alone in chronic, treatment refractory heroin addicts. In general, the Board remains concerned 
over the possible proliferation of heroin experiments and the adoption of social policies, including 
the prescription of heroin before projects have undergone full and independent evaluation. The 
Board also remains concerned over the effect that the experiments may have on global efforts to 
deal with the drug problem.41  
The Board’s 1998 Report was preceded by a mission to the Netherlands, with the Dutch HAT 
trial high on the list of topics for discussion, and it was in regular touch with the Dutch 
authorities in the subsequent years. It was on the INCB mission that the ‘strong figure’ in the 
Health Ministry, mentioned above, gave an outspoken rebuttal of its position on HAT, 
defending the Dutch views in unequivocal terms when the government met the Board’s 
representatives.42  
It is worth noting that within the Netherlands itself the HAT trials were highly controversial, though the 
general public appeared largely in favour. Within the coalition government in power between 1994 and 
2002, the Health Minister, Mrs. Borst-Eiler, was the driving force behind the development of heroin 
assisted treatment.43 As observed by one of our interviewees, ‘HAT occurred in politically highly sensitive 
and turbulent surroundings’. Even with the governing coalition, it was controversial; this reluctance and 
resistance only faded as a consequence of the meticulous approach of the HAT trial policy and 
subsequent reporting and debate within parliament. The HAT process required confirmation and 
approval at every step of the way.44 
In May 2002, the general election in the Netherlands brought about a radical change in 
government, with a largely right-wing coalition elected. The HAT process underwent a critical 
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step at this stage, initially being rejected by the incoming government in an emergency vote, 
which was reversed following large demonstration by one of the coalition partners, ‘Liveable 
Rotterdam’, who agenda included elements normally considered to lie on the progressive 
dimension of politics. Overall, the Netherlands has however been one of those countries that 
embraced the use of diamorphine in its treatment system, with HAT now provided in 17 
outlets in 16 cities, and a total of 668 treatment slots currently available.45   
The Board’s position has itself shifted somewhat since the debates of the early 2000s, with 
our interviewees from several countries citing the May 2015 to May 2017 Presidency of the 
German Werner Sipp as representing something of a turning point in the conduct of the INCB, 
and a significant shift in the approach of the Board and in its relationships with UN Member 
States. 
The 2017 Annual Report stated that:  
Some Governments have been conducting trials with prescription heroin maintenance 
programmes for patients not receiving other forms of treatment, although that is not a first-line 
treatment. Research indicates that prescription heroin maintenance treatment may help heroin-
dependent individuals to remain in treatment, limit their use of street drugs and reduce illegal 
activities.46  
The Report nonetheless follows up this statement with a reservation: 
However, owing to the risk of adverse effects and a number of operational factors, this treatment 
has not been recommended by WHO or other United Nations agencies.47  
The Netherlands earlier defended its heroin prescription programme at the 2007 CND, 
disputing the INCB’s characterisation that the Dutch government provided free heroin to hard 
core addicts, and noting that its heroin co-prescription programme supplied heroin as a 
medicine, in combination with methadone, according to strict criteria, and had achieved 
significant improvements in patients’ health.48 
Nonetheless, the INCB’s views appear arguably to have changed relatively little in practical 
terms since its declaration in 1999, in the wake of the ECDD’s methodological critique of the 
PROVE trials, that:  
The INCB, for its part, will continue to be guided in this matter by the relevant resolutions of the 
World Health Assembly of 1953 and of the United Nations Commission on Narcotic Drugs, which 
in 1995 recalled its previous resolutions of 1978 and 1987, in which it had strongly urged 
Governments to prohibit the use of heroin on human beings.49  
The Board’s position here was undoubtedly influenced by cultural and historical factors, 
mediated by the powerful influence of the United States, which has since the early 20th 
century been implacably opposed to the use of heroin. The US had attempted in the 1920s to 
impose its domestic prohibition on the manufacture of this drug on the then administrator of 
the international drug control regime, the League of Nations, stopping production in all 
countries. The move was not a success but illustrates the existence of a set of attitudes that 
later became highly influential in the regime.50 
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General opposition to HAT and the use of heroin 
According to Uchtenhagen, a set of related anxieties and concerns underlie the opposition to 
HAT. He lists them as follows: the idea that patients will demand ever greater dosages of 
heroin; the attenuation of the will to abstinence and recovery; an increase in ill health and 
overdose deaths; diversion of supplies into the illicit economy; sending out the ‘wrong 
message’ on drug use, and finally the waste of human and financial resources. In practice, 
however, an examination of the evidence shows that these fears have not been realised: 
dosages have tended to decrease rather than increase across the trials, significant numbers 
of clients have achieved or moved toward abstinence, morbidity has been reduced, mortality 
rates improved for both HAT and oral methadone engagement, while strict supervision has 
prevented diversion of prescribed diamorphine. Criminal justice involvement has been 
significantly reduced amongst HAT patients as compared to those receiving oral methadone. 
Fears of a negative impact of HAT centres on the surrounding community, while reported 
often prior to trials, have generally been assuaged by the failure of the anticipated large 
numbers of street addicts to materialise, and a reduction in crime, street nuisance and drug-
related litter. Smart noted the community level outcomes of the trials were not tested in 
RCTs, 51  but it is surely stretching the positivist epistemological and methodological model 
underlying these studies to imagine that a comparable urban area identical to those in which 
the trials took place could be identified that replicated them in every way except for the 
presence of a HAT facility. Qualitative data are best suited to answering such questions, and 
for the present these have indicated the absence of negative community impacts. 
Influence of HAT trials on domestic drug policies  
Many of the countries that conducted trials with heroin assisted treatment have gone on to 
establish the therapy as a part of the regular treatment apparatus, albeit as a second-line 
treatment. Germany, for instance, modified its drugs legislation in 2009 to permit the 
prescribing of heroin. The pilot study for the HAT trials in Germany was at first resisted by the 
INCB but was legal within the terms of the international drug control conventions, and the 
country’s Federal government was therefore able to move ahead with the project.52  
HAT was regarded as a very important project in Germany. The goals were integrated into the 
country’s broader drug control strategy within Federal and State structures, and sought to 
prevent or minimise drug use, facilitate access to counselling, support and treatment for a 
broad range of drug users and their ‘significant others’, and to reduce or at least maintain the 
levels of adverse health and social impacts. 
The results of Germany’s heroin-assisted treatment of opiate dependence pilot have been 
scientifically evaluated. 53  The findings were to be incorporated into the dependence 
treatment provided to heroin dependent persons who failed in substitution or drug free 
treatment (that is, patients who used psychoactive substances besides their substitution 
medication for a certain period of time). A clinical study was conducted in seven German 
cities. 1,032 patients were included at the study centres from 2003 - 2006. One study group 
was provided with diamorphine and the other group with methadone. The groups were 
randomised. Both groups also received psycho-social support, such as psycho-education or 
case management. The retention rate of heroin-assisted treatment was 67 % after 12 months, 
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slightly lower than in the studies from Switzerland and The Netherlands. Only 39% of the 
methadone group completed their treatment. This was mainly due to the fact that one third 
of the randomised patients of the control group attended for treatment. It should be noted, 
however, that at the 12-month examination, 39 % of the dropouts of the heroin group and 44 
% of the dropouts of the methadone group were still in maintenance treatment outside the 
study or in alternative addiction treatment.  
On the main conclusion of this study, the lead investigator stated that: 
‘Heroin-assisted treatment proves to be decidedly successful in the treatment of the most 
severely dependent heroin users.’54  
The group of “treatment-failed” heroin dependents was successfully recruited. Their health 
improved substantially according to various measures: their street heroin consumption 
decreased considerably and there was no increase in their cocaine consumption. After 12 
months, heroin-assisted treatment showed significantly better results with respect to 
improvement in health and the reduction of illicit drug use than methadone treatment. The 
effects are largely independent of the target group, psychosocial intervention forms and 
study centre.  
The study also demonstrated that diamorphine treatment can be safely and effectively 
implemented. No study-related death occurred. The mortality rate was equal in both groups, 
with all death cases due to previous illnesses. But higher safety risk in the heroin group 
(because of injection of the substance) calls for treatment in special out-patient clinics and 
does not allow a policy for heroin as a ‘take home’ medication. Heroin-assisted treatment is 
significantly more effective than methadone maintenance treatment for this specific group 
of long-term drug users with respect to improvement in health and decreased of illicit drug 
use. As an important additional value, heroin prescription led to a considerable reduction of 
drug related crimes. 
In May 2009 the German Parliament passed an amendment to the Narcotic Law which 
permitted, under certain strictly regulated conditions, the prescribing of diamorphine to 
clients who were not benefitting from treatment with methadone or buprenorphine. The 
implementation phase into the treatment system is well underway, with some 300 – 400 
patients are currently in heroin-assisted treatment. 
In Spain and Canada, according to Uchtenhagen,55 only those patients who formerly took part 
in trials are allowed the prescribed substance; the approach has not, consequently, been 
integrated into the regular drug treatment systems of those countries. Indeed, in Spain, 
researchers complained of a tangled and hostile relationship between science and politics.56 
They say that the Spanish Drug Agency omitted the Swiss clinical experience with oral 
Immediate Release (IR) heroin when it requested the Catalan Oral Heroin Study Group to 
refrain from conducting a randomised controlled trial comparing this form of the drug with 
sustained release morphine and methadone. These authors also point to the blocking by the 
Ministry of the Interior of a well-designed trial that was to have been run in 2004-5 within a 
prison in the Basque region. This Ministry is responsible for overseeing prisons in Spain, and 
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such events point to the political hostility that exists toward HAT, despite its proven 
effectiveness as a second-line treatment for people who use heroin. 
Developments in HAT treatments in Norway and other countries 
In contrast, certain countries have judged the evidence base for HAT generated by the Swiss 
study and the subsequent RCTs to be sufficient to proceed to the opening of HAT facilities 
without the need to conduct their own trials. Denmark, for example, has moved straight to 
the use of HAT without establishing its own trial, concluding that the country was socially and 
culturally similar enough to Germany, the Netherlands and Switzerland for existing trial 
findings to be transnational in application. The country has set up five HAT facilities since 
2010, when the first opened in Copenhagen.57 Luxembourg, likewise, opened its first HAT 
clinic in 2017, and Norway announced at the 62nd Commission on Narcotic Drugs (CND) held 
in Vienna in 2019 that it intended to establish experimental HAT facilities, opening in 2020, 
with the experiences and knowledge gained being used to decide on whether the intervention 
will be extended into the permanent drug treatment system. 
The Norwegian move is regarded by many as something of a surprise. Despite its well-
deserved reputation as a progressive state in which health and human rights are embedded, 
Norway’s drug policy stance has historically tended toward the oppressive. A period of debate 
in the early 21st century resulted in the government considering the introduction of HAT. 
However, it rejected the move. In the (undated) words of the Europe Against Drugs pressure 
group: 
a new Norwegian white paper on alcohol, drugs and doping says no to heroin assisted treatment 
(HAT) in Norway. The Government bases its rejection of heroin distribution on consultations with 
experts and interest groups as well as on the advice of two expert commissions that have 
evaluated the evidence for the efficiency and cost effectiveness of heroin assisted treatment. The 
current evidence base is weak, the intended target group for HAT is excluded in international 
studies and effects are only marginally better than other substitution treatments, states the 
white paper. 58  
However, in October 2016, the Conservative government’s Health Minister announced a 
major change in the direction of the country’s drug policies, stating that the 48 million Kroner 
collected from fines for drug possession was ‘detrimental and meaningless’. Instead, Norway 
would follow the general terms of the Portuguese drug strategy, transferring drug use 
responses from the Criminal Justice system to the Health sector. HAT was to be an element 
of this new Norwegian approach. 
In the UK, despite the success of the trial, the three RIOTT clinics in London, Brighton and 
Darlington were forced to close in 2016 when the government withdrew funding from the 
HAT project. It is worth noting that in its December 2016 report, Reducing Opioid-Related 
Deaths in the UK,  the Advisory Council on the Misuse of Drugs noted that ‘Central 
government funding should be provided to support HAT for patients for whom other forms 
of Opioid Substitution Treatment have not been effective.’59 In this spirit, in October 2019, a 
new HAT pilot facility opened its doors in Middlesbrough.60 Lack of central funding meant that 
this is not only supported as an effective intervention, but also funded by the local Police and 
Crime Commissioner (PCC). If deemed to be successful following independent evaluation, the 
18 | P a g e  
 
PCC plans to use funding from the Proceeds of Crime Act to extend it for a second year and 
across all four Boroughs of Cleveland, of which Middlesbrough is a part.61  The clinic currently 
has places for an initial 15 clients, drawn from those whose lives are most involved with the 
cycle of crime and imprisonment, buying and using street heroin and living and dying on the 
streets of the town.  
In an astute comment summing up the benefits of HAT, the PCC observed that:  
By removing street heroin from the equation you remove the need to commit crime to fund 
addiction and the impact this has on local residents and businesses, you remove the health risks 
of street heroin and the associated drugs litter and you remove the drain on public services 
including health and police. In addition, you halt the flow of funding to drugs gangs.62 
A second HAT facility is shortly to open in Glasgow, a city which faces record levels of overdose 
and a new wave of HIV infections associated with its sizeable illicit heroin market. 63 
Discussions are also taking place elsewhere within the UK, including Durham and the West 
Midlands, usually – as was the case in Middlesbrough – driven by the local PCC.  Despite the 
manifold benefits, including savings across health and criminal justice sectors over time, the 
relatively high cost per client ensures that funding remains a perennial consideration and 
oftentimes barrier.64     
Concluding remarks: Heroin assisted treatment and the future direction of UN 
travel 
Although the INCB has clearly long been hostile to drug policy innovation, and this has carried 
over into its attitudes to HAT, it is likely that national governments are the main source of 
reluctance to make use of this intervention. This is the case even in the context of the present 
epidemics of opioid-related overdose, morbidity and mortality. A combination of the 
financially expensive nature of the treatment and a historical and cultural anxiety surrounding 
diamorphine is likely to motivate those governments hostile to HAT. They will doubtless 
deploy the INCB’s rhetoric when convenient, but the Board is unlikely to constitute the 
fundamental block on making use of this treatment. It may, however, be influential at the 
level of the international control apparatus. 
In the 2012 revision of the 2009 Technical Guide for Countries to set Targets for Universal 
Access to HIV Prevention, Treatment and Care for Injecting drug users, produced by WHO, 
UNODC and UNAIDS, the use of agonists other than methadone receives a mention.  The 
Guide observes that diamorphine, slow-release morphine and opium tincture are used in a 
small number of countries and may be used in maintenance treatment. However, they receive 
little discussion.65 Since then, however, the WHO has been surprisingly reticent in its support 
for the rolling out of HAT, a life-saving treatment with significant potential to alleviate the 
present epidemic of morbidity and mortality associated with street heroin and related opioids 
such as fentanyl. 
The most recent and likely the most promising UN statement on the use of HAT in the 
treatment of addiction came from the UN system coordination Task Team on the 
Implementation of the UN System Common Position on drug-related matters, which was set 
up by the Chief Executives Board of the United Nations, a high-level body that oversees 
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strategic decisions, represents 31 UN agencies and is chaired by the Secretary General. In 
addition to its unequivocal advocacy of a public health and human rights-based agenda, the 
Task Team’s Report, entitled What we have learned over the last ten years: A summary of 
knowledge acquired and produced by the UN system on drug-related matters addressed the 
issue of HAT directly, stating that: 
Heroin-assisted treatment refers to the prescription of synthetic, injectable or smokable heroin to 
a minority of people with opioid dependence who do not respond to treatment with one of the 
established medications used in long-acting agonist maintenance therapy, such as methadone or 
buprenorphine. For this small group of patients, heroin-assisted treatment has been found 
effective in improving their social and health situation. It has also been shown to be cost-effective, 
as it reduces costs of arrests, trials, incarceration and health interventions. In this approach, 
patients are provided with a form of pharmaceutical-grade heroin (injection) solution. 66  
This is a factual account of the treatment, without the INCB’s oft-reiterated ‘concerns’ over 
its deployment. In the context of the broader report, it is viewed as one of the important new 
tools made available by the lessons that the UN has learned in recent times, with a forward 
by the UN Secretary General Mr Antonio Guterres, former Portuguese President. The review 
of HAT and its presence in such an eminent UN report is encouraging, as the growing evidence 
base for this treatment should outweigh the cultural anxieties and prejudices that cluster 
around it. In the light of the massive increase in opioid overdose mortality during recent years, 
the introduction of HAT may well be one of the measures that could save significant numbers 
of lives if its provision is expanded.  And the UN international drug control agencies should 
play a key and urgent leadership role in this context. 
As has been conclusively demonstrated above, the INCB has in the past at least attempted to 
act as a blockage in the path of innovative strategies for the treatment of some of the most 
intractably problematic forms of illicit drug consumption. Possibly, the shifts brought about 
in the Board’s approach since the Presidency of Werner Sipp will be maintained and expanded 
upon, and Board will assume a new role of encouraging new and promising policies and 
interventions.67 It is also to be hoped that the interpellation of the System Coordination Task 
Team may contribute to a thaw in the chilling effect that the INCB and other elements in the 
drug control regime have had on the development and roll-out of HAT, despite the impressive 
evidence base it has now accumulated. Finally, the WHO in particular can, and arguably 
should, play an important role in these efforts, particularly in view of the capacity of heroin 
assisted treatment to limit the epidemic of overdose which is presently casting its shadow 
across several areas of the planet. 
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